Greg Detre
28/2/00
assumes that the neurophysical detail is non-functional with regard to qualia
he�s ascribing him beliefs (at least that they�re wholly in evidence)
and so surely concepts, representations (+ images) which = conscious experience!
no, concepts, representations + images do not give rise to/are not the same as consciousness
is there a difference between beliefs + their neural correlate, e.g. dispositional representations?
whoa, isn't that � empiricism!
beliefs characterised by their role in the mind�s causal economy
qualia are nto the primary mehcanism in the self-ascription of mental states
= the question should then boil down to whether or not a non-conscious zombie contains the requisitely complex neural machinery without conscious to appear to have belief
no, I�m wrong � if zombie Dave can answer and to all purposes seem and act as though belief without conscious experience then those beliefs are contained as neural representations
so, what am I saying � yes, if the zombie is physiologically and behaviourally identical but lacking qualia/conscious experience, then yes it would have beliefs (by the definition of beliefs in terms of actions)
but perhaps I�m debating that there is any way that the mental can be divorced from the physical processes
this takes us back to Goldman�s functionally isomorphic being which is, unlikea� zombie, non-human and would pass the Turing test
having the working body of a human � being a human
(doesn't it strengthen the case further to have it indistinguishable externally as well, like a zombie?)
so, do I think that qualia are related to the self-ascription of belief or not?
if his argument is correct, does it undermine mine by taking away my certainty in self-ascribing qualia, or is it that his has been undermined first by mine?
Chalmers says that the only way to deny that Zombie Dave ascribes himself qualia (as do we, but supposedly correctly � how would it feel to have no qualia?
well, it wouldn't, by definition, so I suppose that the Cogito sort of proves that we have conscious experience, in case that was ever in doubt
oand that qualia are �mostly along for the ride� is to deny the conceptual possibility of Zombie Dave by saying that functional organisation is conceptually constitutive of qualitative content
no other tenable middle ground between functionalism + epiphenomenalism
epiphenomenalism � doctrine that mental phenomena are not causal, despite the fact that they may seem to be
non-reductive physicalism � claim that functional properties cannot be reduced to physical properties, but that nevertheless all causality is physical
epiphenomenon � a secondary symptom which may occur simultaneously with a disease but is not regarded as its cause/result
consciousness regarded as a by-product of brain-activity
difference between epiphenomenalism and supervenience???